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RETHINKING JANUS: PRESERVING PRIMARYPARTICIPANT LIABILITY IN SEC ANTIFRAUD
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
GREG GAUGHT†
ABSTRACT
The Securities and Exchange Commission relies heavily on the
securities laws’ antifraud provisions in fulfilling its role as watchdog
of the U.S. securities markets. But the Supreme Court’s decision in
Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders has frustrated
the SEC’s efforts to keep fraud at bay. There the Court drastically
narrowed the scope of actors who can qualify as primary participants
in misrepresentations perpetrated in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities under Rule 10b-5(b). This Note argues that Janus’s
holding creates an incongruence in the SEC’s ability to enforce the
securities laws’ misrepresentation provisions, with the SEC’s ability to
prosecute misrepresentations now varying depending on the stage of
securities dealings at which the misrepresentation occurred. This
result runs counter to the SEC’s purpose in creating Rule 10b-5 and to
Congress’s desire that the SEC enjoy broad authority to pursue
fraudsters. This Note analyzes solutions for curing this incongruence,
including the SEC’s recent bid for judicial deference to its
interpretations of the relevant regulations and statutes.

INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the
Commission) has long been the primary overseer of the U.S.
securities markets. Among the most important regulatory tools at the
Commission’s disposal are the provisions targeting fraudulent
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conduct perpetrated at the various stages of securities dealings. These
primary antifraud provisions, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1
1933 (Securities Act) and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
2
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), deal, respectively, with fraudulent
activities occurring in the “offer and sale” of a security, and those
occurring in subsequent “purchase or sale” of a security on secondary
markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus Capital Group, Inc.
3
v. First Derivative Traders, however, the SEC is at risk of having an
incongruent ability to prosecute fraudsters depending on the stage of
securities dealings at which their actions took place.
In Janus, the Supreme Court limited the scope of actors who can
4
be held liable as primary participants under SEC Rule 10b-5(b),
promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, for making
materially misleading statements or omissions in connection with the
5
purchase or sale of a security. In addressing a Rule 10b-5(b) claim
brought by private litigants under Rule 10b-5’s implied private right
of action, the Court held that to “make” an untrue statement within
the meaning of Rule 10b-5(b) requires having “ultimate authority
over the statement, including its content and whether and how to
6
communicate it.”
Janus’s “ultimate authority” rule has bred uncertainty regarding
the SEC’s ability to pursue primary participants under the federal
securities antifraud provisions. This uncertainty stems mainly from
the fact that Janus involved a suit brought under Rule 10b-5’s implied
7
private right of action. In such cases, the Court consistently interprets

1. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2012).
2. Id. § 78j(b). For an overview of the Exchange Act’s enactment, see generally Steve
Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV.
385 (1990).
3. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2015). Rule 10b-5(b) makes it
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.
Id.
5. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (holding that misstatement liability under Rule 10b-5(b) is
proper only for those with “ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and
whether and how to communicate it”).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 2299.
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securities laws restrictively to give “narrow dimensions . . . to a right
of action Congress did not authorize when it first enacted the
8
statute.” The SEC, by contrast, enjoys Congress’s explicit blessing to
bring enforcement suits against those who violate the securities laws,
9
including Rule 10b-5. The Court’s approach to implied private rights
of action under these securities laws therefore raises the question of
whether Janus was meant to interpret what “make” means only in the
10
context of private securities litigation under Rule 10b-5, or whether
the Court’s interpretation was meant to apply with equal force to the
11
SEC. But concluding that Janus applies to SEC enforcement actions
brought under Rule 10b-5(b) only raises the question of why the
Court interpreted “make” in the manner it did—by relying on
precedents that do not affect the SEC. This Note offers an
explanation for the Court’s methodology by considering the SEC’s
intentions in promulgating Rule 10b-5 and Congress’s reactions to
other judicial interpretations in implied private-right-of-action suits.
This Note also takes a fresh look at whether Janus should apply
to other theories used by the SEC to target misrepresentations:
enforcement actions brought under Section 17(a)(2) and those
brought via a scheme-liability theory under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c).
Section 17(a)(2), like Rule 10b-5(b), provides the SEC with the ability
to prosecute actors for misrepresentations. But two differences are
significant. First, Section 17(a)(2) prohibits misrepresentations “in the
offer and sale of securities,” and does not apply to the
postdistribution purchase of securities on the secondary markets,
which is Rule 10b-5(b)’s domain. Second, rather than prohibiting
12
“mak[ing] any untrue statement of a material fact,” as Rule 10b-5(b)
does, Section 17(a)(2) prohibits “obtain[ing] money or property by

8. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 167 (2008).
9. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78kk
(2012) (establishing the SEC’s broad enforcement authority of securities laws).
10. See Donald C. Langevoort, Lies Without Liars? Janus Capital and Conservative
Securities Jurisprudence, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 933, 941 (2013) (arguing that in Janus “we are
being told what ‘make’ means in the context of private securities litigation under Rule 10b-5,
leaving open how it is to be construed in the context of public enforcement”).
11. See Bryan P. King, The Effects of an Undefined “Ultimate Authority” Standard for Rule
10b-5 Claims: Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 405,
430 (2012) (“While the SEC has wider authority to bring suits under Rule 10b-5 than individuals
in private actions, the Court did not provide one definition of the word ‘make’ for private
actions, and a separate definition for SEC actions.”).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2015).
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means of any untrue statement of a material fact.” Given, however,
that both provisions are designed to perform the same function, just
14
at different stages of securities dealings, many scholars have
questioned whether Janus’s narrow interpretation of Rule 10b-5(b)
also applies to Section 17(a)(2). Janus’s application, if any, to Rule
10b-5(a) and (c) scheme-liability claims also warrants attention given
that not applying the ultimate authority rule to such claims could
allow the SEC to prosecute the conduct Rule 10b-5(b) forbids while
avoiding Janus’s constraints. Congress’s approach to the scope of the
federal securities laws provides additional insight into Janus’s reach
by exposing Congress’s preferences regarding the appropriate scope
of the SEC’s power to enforce the antifraud provisions.
This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I focuses on the relevant
statutory background for Janus and the precedents invoked to
support the ultimate authority rule. Part II analyzes the Janus opinion
itself and the various factors motivating the Court’s formulation of
the ultimate authority rule. Part III analyzes Janus’s impact on the
various theories by which the SEC can target misrepresentations,
including a Rule 10b-5(b) enforcement action, a scheme-liability
theory via Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), and a Section 17(a)(2) enforcement
action. These inquiries show that applying Janus to SEC enforcement
actions under Rule 10b-5(b) creates an incongruence between the
SEC’s ability to prosecute actors for misrepresentations in connection
with the purchase of securities under Rule 10b-5(b) and those in
connection with the offer of securities under Section 17(a)(2). Part IV
proposes solutions to this gap, including the SEC’s recent bid to
secure judicial deference for its interpretations concerning Janus’s
reach.
I. JANUS’S ROOTS: THE SECURITIES LAWS’ ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS
AND PRIVATE-ACTION JURISPRUDENCE
Understanding Janus and appreciating its implications for the
SEC’s enforcement authority requires a grasp of both the relevant
statutory provisions and the precedent used to support the Court’s
holding. This Part first describes the securities laws’ antifraud
15
provisions, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of

13. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2012).
14. See infra notes 131–32 and accompanying text.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2012).
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16

the Exchange Act, and their key differences. It then introduces the
private-action precedent the Court relied on in Janus to interpret
“make” in Rule 10b-5.
A. The Securities Laws’ Antifraud Provisions
The Securities Act regulates the offer and sale of securities. The
Act’s antifraud provision, Section 17(a), makes it unlawful to engage
in certain conduct at this stage of securities dealings. Section 17(a)(1)
17
prohibits “employ[ing] any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.”
Section 17(a)(2), the misrepresentation provision, prohibits
“obtain[ing] money or property by means of any untrue statement of
18
a material fact or any [material] omission.” And Section 17(a)(3)
prohibits “engag[ing] in any transaction, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
19
the purchaser.”
The Exchange Act regulates the trading of securities on
20
secondary markets and seeks to eliminate abuses in trading of
21
securities after their initial distribution. Section 10(b) of the
22
Exchange Act is the key antifraud provision of the federal securities
laws applying to postdistribution trading. This Section authorizes the
23
SEC to promulgate antifraud rules that proscribe the use of “any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” “in connection with
24
the purchase or sale of any security.” The Commission used this
16. Id. § 78j(b).
17. Id. § 77q(a)(1).
18. Id. § 77q(a)(2).
19. Id. § 77q(a)(3).
20. Robert M. Lawless, Stephen P. Ferris & Bryan Bacon, The Influence of Legal Liability
on Corporate Financial Signaling, 23 J. CORP. L. 209, 218 (1998) (“[T]he 1934 Act governs the
trading of securities in the secondary markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange or the
NASDAQ.”).
21. Combatting fraud in the secondary securities markets is the primary focus of the
Exchange Act. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881, 881 (1934)
(describing the Exchange Act’s purpose as to “prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such
exchanges and markets”).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
23. Id.; see also id. § 78w(a) (stating that the Commission has the “power to make such
rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this
chapter for which they are responsible or for the execution of the functions vested in them by
this chapter”).
24. Id. § 78j(b). In its entirety, Section 10(b) makes it unlawful
to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on
a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securitiesbased swap agreement[,] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
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grant to create Rule 10b-5, which over time became the “primary
private remedy for fraud available under the Securities Exchange
26
Act.” This Rule implements the Commission’s authority under
Section 10(b) in three ways. Rule 10b-5(a) prohibits “employ[ing] any
27
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.” Rule 10b-5(b), the
misrepresentation provision at issue in Janus, prohibits “mak[ing] any
untrue statement of a material fact or [omitting] to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made . . . not
28
misleading.” Finally, Rule 10b-5(c) prohibits “engag[ing] in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
29
fraud or deceit upon any person.”
The format and language of Rule 10b-5 bears a striking
resemblance to that of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, and for
good reason. Indeed, “the SEC’s ‘only purpose’ in adopting Rule 10b5 was to make the same prohibitions contained in Section 17(a)—
which applies in connection with the ‘offer and sale’ of a security—
30
applicable to ‘purchasers’ of securities as well.” If Rule 10b-5 was
intended to essentially apply Section 17(a) to purchasers of securities
on secondary markets, should Janus’s interpretation of Rule 10b-5 be
imported to Section 17(a)?
B. Janus’s Private-Action Precedent
The Court has been consistent in giving “narrow dimensions . . .
to a right of action Congress did not authorize when it first enacted
31
the statute.” This desire to constrain the scope of liability under the
implied right of action guided the Court’s interpretation of Rule 10b32
5(b)’s “make” in Janus. Indeed, the two cases the Court relied on to

contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015).
26. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.3[1] (6th ed. 2009).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a).
28. Id. § 240.10b-5(b).
29. Id. § 240.10b-5(c).
30. SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855
(2d Cir. 1968)).
31. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 167 (2008).
32. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2303 (2011) (“Our
holding accords with the narrow scope that we must give the implied private [right of action].”
(citing Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 167)).
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reach its holding in Janus—Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
33
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. and Stoneridge Investment Partners,
34
LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. —were responsive to concerns present
solely in claims brought under implied private rights of action.
1. Restricting Aiding-and-Abetting Liability: Central Bank of
Denver. In Central Bank, the Supreme Court held for the first time—
while addressing a suit brought under Section 10(b)’s implied private
right of action—that liability under Section 10(b) does not extend to
35
aiders and abettors. From the outset the Court stressed the type of
action at issue, asking the parties to address a question not presented
in the petition: “Whether there is an implied private right of action
for aiding and abetting violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities
36
Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b–5.” In answering this
question, the Court narrowed the scope of liability under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 on two grounds: the statutory language and
concerns for aider-and-abettor liability’s impact on the element of
reliance that private plaintiffs must prove.
Addressing the statutory language, the Court emphasized that
“the text of the statute controls,” and thus “the private plaintiff may
not bring a 10b-5 suit against a defendant for acts not prohibited by
37
the text of Section 10(b).” Because the statute’s “proscription does
not include giving aid to a person who commits a manipulative or
deceptive act,” the Court reasoned that liability under Section 10(b)
38
does not extend to aiders and abettors. Second, and though the
Court’s focus on the statute’s text apparently binds the SEC to the
39
same degree it does private plaintiffs, the Court buttressed its
33. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
34. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
35. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 177. The SEC defines aiders and abettors as those who
“provide[] substantial assistance to another person in violation of a provision of this chapter, or
of any rule or regulation issued under this chapter.” 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012).
36. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 508 U.S. 959, 959
(1993) (mem.).
37. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 173; see also id. at 177 (“It is inconsistent with the settled
methodology in § 10(b) cases to extend liability beyond the scope of conduct prohibited by the
statutory text.”).
38. Id. at 177.
39. Justice Stevens voiced this very concern in his dissent:
[T]his case concerns only the existence and scope of aiding and abetting liability in
suits brought by private parties under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The majority’s
rationale, however, sweeps far beyond those important issues. The majority leaves
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holding by referencing a concern attendant only upon private actions.
Significantly to the Court, that Section 10(b) liability does not reach
aiders and abettors necessarily follows from the need to preserve the
requirement that private plaintiffs “show reliance on the defendant’s
40
misstatement or omission to recover under 10b-5.” That is, because
an aider and abettor has not “engaged in such a proscribed act, but
merely assisted in its commission, to permit recovery against such a
defendant would allow the plaintiff to circumvent the reliance
requirement which the Court has repeatedly held was a part of the
41
plaintiff’s case.” The Court therefore concluded that aiding-andabetting liability was improper because “the defendant could be liable
without any showing that the plaintiff relied upon the aider and
42
abettor’s statements or actions.”
2. The Reliance Requirement: Stoneridge Investment Partners. In
Stoneridge, the Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split
regarding “when, if ever, an injured investor may rely upon § 10(b) to
recover from a party that neither makes a public misstatement nor
violates a duty to disclose but does participate in a scheme to violate
43
§ 10(b).” The plaintiff sued Scientific Atlanta, Inc. (Scientific44
Atlanta) for participating in a scheme to violate Section 10(b),
alleging that Scientific-Atlanta entered into fraudulent contracts with
Charter Communications, Inc. (Charter) that helped Charter inflate

little doubt that the Exchange Act does not even permit the SEC to pursue aiders and
abettors in civil enforcement actions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Id. at 199–200 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Joel Seligman, The Implications of Central Bank,
49 BUS. LAW 1429, 1435 (1994) (stating that “it appears highly probable that the lower courts
will conclude that the logic of Central Bank equally applies to SEC and private aiding and
abetting claims under [S]ection 10(b)”).
40. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 180 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988)). A
private plaintiff bringing a Section 10(b) and/or Rule 10b-5 action must establish the following:
“(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance
upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.” Stoneridge
Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008).
41. James D. Cox, Just Desserts for Accountants and Attorneys After Bank of Denver, 38
ARIZ. L. REV. 519, 520 (1997); see also Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 180 (“[The plaintiff’s] argument
would impose 10b-5 aiding and abetting liability when at least one element critical for recovery
under 10b-5 is absent: reliance. . . . Allowing plaintiffs to circumvent the reliance requirement
would disregard the careful limits on 10b-5 recovery mandated by our earlier cases.”).
42. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 180.
43. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 156.
44. Id. at 155.
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45

its revenue and operating cash flow. Charter then included this
inflated number on financial statements filed with the SEC and
46
reported to the public financial statements that Scientific-Atlanta
47
had no hand in preparing or disseminating. Scientific-Atlanta’s own
financial statements listed the transactions in accordance with
48
generally accepted accounting principles.
In its decision, the Court addressed the issue solely in terms of
49
the reliance element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The Court
reiterated that “[r]eliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant’s
deceptive acts is an essential element of the § 10(b) private cause of
50
action.” But nothing Scientific-Atlanta did “made it necessary or
51
inevitable for Charter to record the transactions as it did.” In such
circumstances, “the investors cannot be said to have relied upon any
of [Scientific-Atlanta’s] deceptive acts in the decision to purchase or
sell securities,” and primary liability under Section 10(b) was
52
therefore inappropriate. Following its methodology in Central Bank,
the Court displayed a desire to prevent expansion of the implied
private right of action and invoked various policy considerations in
53
support of its holding. Its inquiry again focused on policy concerns
attendant only to suits brought under the implied private right of
54
action. For example, expanding the scope of liability would “expose
a new class of defendants to [the] risks” of frivolous lawsuits brought
55
to extort settlements.

45. Id. at 153–55.
46. Id. at 155.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 159 (holding that “respondents’ acts or statements were not relied upon by the
investors, and that, as a result, liability cannot be imposed upon respondents” (emphasis
added)).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 161.
52. Id. at 166–67.
53. See id. at 167 (“This conclusion is consistent with the narrow dimensions we must give
to a right of action Congress did not authorize when it first enacted the statute . . . .”); see also
id. at 165 (“Concerns with the judicial creation of a private cause of action caution against its
expansion. The decision to extend the cause of action is for Congress, not for us. Though it
remains the law, the § 10(b) private right should not be extended beyond its present
boundaries.”).
54. See id. at 161–64 (describing the policy concerns).
55. Id. at 163–64.
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Central Bank and Stoneridge significantly influenced the creation
56
of the ultimate authority rule in Janus and helped chart the course
the Court has subsequently followed in narrowly defining the scope of
primary-participant liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Janus, in narrowing the scope of primary-participant liability under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in an implied private-right-of-action
case, is but the Court’s most recent tapering of private rights of action
under the securities laws.
II. THE JANUS DECISION AND ULTIMATE AUTHORITY
In Janus, the Court followed the path set forth in Central Bank
and Stoneridge and once again limited the scope of actors who can be
held liable as primary participants under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5. As in those cases, concerns for preventing the expansion of the
implied private right of action guided the Court’s holding. The Court
interpreted “make” in Rule 10b-5(b) such that only the person or
entity with “ultimate authority over the statement, including its
content and whether and how to communicate it” can be liable under
57
the provision.
A. Factual Background
Janus Capital Group created multiple mutual funds, one of
which, Janus Investment Fund—a separate entity owned by mutualfund investors—retained Janus Capital Group’s wholly owned
58
subsidiary, Janus Capital Management, as its investment advisor.
Janus Investment Fund issued multiple prospectuses to its investors
that “represented that the funds were not suitable for market
59
timing” and could have been “read to suggest that [Janus Capital

56. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302–03 (2011)
(describing the support the “ultimate authority” rule finds in Central Bank and Stoneridge).
57. Id. at 2302.
58. Id. at 2299.
59. Market timing is a trading strategy that exploits time delay in a mutual fund’s daily
valuation system. Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio
Holdings, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,402, 70,403–04 (proposed Dec. 17, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 239). Due to time delays, the values underlying calculations of the fund’s net asset value
(NAV) do not always accurately reflect the true value of the underlying assets. Id. Thus, if an
event were expected to increase the price of a foreign security, an investor engaging in market
timing could buy shares of a mutual fund at an artificially low NAV and sell the following day
when the NAV corrects upward. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300 n.1 (citing Disclosure Regarding
Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, 68 Fed. Reg. at 70,403–04).
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Management] would implement policies to curb the practice.” But
New York’s Attorney General filed a complaint against Janus Capital
Group and Janus Capital Management alleging that the former
agreed to permit market timing in several funds controlled by the
61
latter. First Derivative Traders, representing a class of Janus Capital
Group stockholders, subsequently brought a suit alleging that Janus
Capital Group and Janus Capital Management violated Section 10(b)
62
and Rule 10b-5.
B. The Ultimate Authority Rule
Justice Thomas framed the issue as “whether [Janus Capital
Management] can be held liable in a private action under Rule 10b-5
for false statements included in Janus Investment Fund’s
63
prospectuses.” Because Rule 10b-5(b) makes it unlawful “[t]o make
any untrue statement of a material fact” in connection with the
64
purchase or sale of securities, imposing liability required finding that
Janus Capital Management “‘made’ the material misstatements in the
65
prospectuses.” But before delving into this issue, Justice Thomas
paid homage to Stoneridge by acknowledging the narrow construction
66
the Court must give to Rule 10b-5’s implied private right of action.
The Court first looked to the dictionary to determine whether
Janus Capital Management “made” the untrue statements in the
67
prospectuses. The Court concluded that “[t]o make any . . .
68
statement” within the meaning of Rule 10b-5(b) means “to state.”
And “[f]or purposes of Rule 10b-5, the maker of a statement is the
person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including
69
its content and whether and how to communicate it.” Without such

60. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2301.
64. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2015).
65. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2301.
66. Id. at 2302 (stating that “we are mindful that we must give ‘narrow dimensions . . . to a
right of action Congress did not authorize when it first enacted the statute and did not expand
when it revisited the law’” (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,
552 U.S. 148, 167 (2008))).
67. Id. (consulting the Oxford English Dictionary).
68. Id.
69. Id.
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“ultimate authority,” the defendant could only suggest what to say,
70
not “make” the statement.
Departing from the dictionary, the Court argued that the
ultimate authority rule necessarily followed from Central Bank’s
holding “that Rule 10b-5’s private right of action does not include
71
suits against aiders and abettors.” Though the SEC is expressly
authorized to bring suits against entities that contribute “substantial
assistance” to the making of a statement but do not actually make it,
72
private parties cannot. From this the Court reasoned that
interpreting “make” broadly as “including persons or entities without
ultimate control over the content of a statement” would undermine
the limits placed on the implied private right of action in Central
73
Bank by rendering aiders and abettors virtually nonexistent.
Justice Thomas found further support in Stoneridge for the
74
Court’s narrow interpretation of “make.” In Stoneridge, the
complaint was dismissed in view of the fact the plaintiffs could “not
75
have relied on the entities’ undisclosed deceptive acts” because—
significantly to Justice Thomas—“nothing [the defendants] did made
it necessary or inevitable for [the company] to record the transactions

70. Id. Contributing to the confusion stemming from Janus, it is unclear from this language
whether “the Court [is] construing the Rule, or just the right of action.” Langevoort, supra note
10, at 938 (emphasis added). That is, although the opinion focused on defining a specific word in
Rule 10b-5, the Court repeatedly called attention to the private nature of the action at issue and
stressed the “narrow dimensions” it must be given. The implication being that if the Court was
interpreting the Rule, then the SEC is bound by the “ultimate authority” rule. If, however, the
Court was interpreting the right of action, then the SEC’s enforcement authority is unaffected.
71. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (emphasis added) (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 180 (1994)).
72. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012)). The U.S. Code provides that
any person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another
person in violation of a provision of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation issued
under this chapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same
extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.
15 U.S.C. § 78t(e).
73. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. Despite the Court’s allusion to a broader aiding-and-abetting
enforcement power in SEC actions than exists in private actions, it is worth noting that if Janus’s
ultimate authority rule applies to SEC actions, the Commission’s aiding-and-abetting authority
would likewise be narrowed. After all, an aider and abettor cannot exist without a primary
violator. And Janus undoubtedly limits the pool of those who can be considered primary
participants.
74. See id. at 2303 (stating that “[t]his interpretation is further supported by our recent
decision in Stoneridge”).
75. Id. (citing Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 166–
67 (2008)).
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as it did.” Without ultimate authority over a statement “it is not
‘necessary or inevitable’ that any falsehood will be contained in the
77
statement.”
Interestingly, Justice Thomas used the principle of narrowing, or
at least not expanding, the scope of the implied private right of action
as bookends for the rule’s formulation. Indeed, in his last argument in
support of the Court’s interpretation of “make” he noted that the
“holding also accords with the narrow scope that [the Court] must
78
give the implied private right of action.” At the outset, Justice
Thomas acknowledged that the Court “must give ‘narrow
dimensions . . . to a right of action Congress did not authorize when it
79
first enacted the statute.’” He further observed that “[c]oncerns with
the judicial creation of a private cause of action caution against its
80
expansion.” Bookending its interpretation of “make” in this manner
further clouds whether “the Court [was] construing the Rule, or just
81
the private right of action.”
Janus’s ultimate authority rule greatly narrows the class of
individuals who can be deemed primary participants in a
misrepresentation under Rule 10b-5(b). This rule resulted largely
from the Court’s desire to give continuing force to its holdings in
Central Bank and Stoneridge. Thus, Janus and its ultimate authority
rule are properly viewed as the Court’s most recent effort to curb
expansion of the judicially created implied private right of action. The
Court did not make clear, however, the limits of Janus’s reach.
III. THE SEC’S INCONGRUENT ANTIFRAUD ENFORCEMENT
AUTHORITY POST-JANUS
Janus raises three questions regarding the ultimate authority
rule’s applicability to SEC enforcement actions. The first is whether
the ultimate authority rule applies to Rule 10b-5(b) misrepresentation
actions brought by the SEC, or is instead cabined to those that are
brought by private plaintiffs under the implied private right of action.
If Janus binds the SEC in Rule 10b-5(b) enforcement actions, then
the scope of actors who can be held liable in such actions has been
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 161).
Id.
Id. (citing Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 167).
Id. at 2302 (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 167).
Id. (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165).
Langevoort, supra note 10, at 938.
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narrowed. As a result, the Commission’s power to prosecute
misrepresentations perpetrated in connection with the purchase of a
82
security on the secondary markets has been drastically reduced. The
second is whether the SEC can avoid Janus’s narrowing effect on
Rule 10b-5(b) claims by using scheme liability under Rule 10b-5(a)
and (c) to prosecute conduct that cannot meet the ultimate authority
test. Finally, the third is whether the ultimate authority rule also
applies to Section 17(a)(2) misrepresentation actions brought by the
SEC since both Rule 10b-5(b) and Section 17(a)(2) were intended to
83
serve the same purpose, just at different stages of securities dealings.
Finding that Janus applies to Rule 10b-5(b) but not Section 17(a)(2)
would mean that the SEC now has less ability to prosecute
misrepresentations perpetrated in connection with the purchase of
securities than in the offer of those same securities.
A. Janus’s Impact on the SEC’s Ability to Prosecute Fraud
Perpetrated in Connection with the Purchase of Securities: Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b)
At the threshold, the nontextual considerations underlying the
Court’s interpretation of Rule 10b-5(b) in Janus do not apply to SEC
enforcement actions brought under the same provision. The Court
left multiple hints rendering it plausible that Janus can be interpreted
differently depending on who brings the action. For starters, the
Court’s own framing of the issue at hand was whether the defendant
84
“can be held liable in a private action under . . . Rule 10b-5.” And
following its articulation of the ultimate authority rule, the Court
approvingly noted that its “holding accords with the narrow scope
85
that we must give the implied private right of action.” It therefore
would appear that the Court was interpreting the meaning of “make”
86
as it applies specifically in private actions.
82. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015) (stating that the proscribed fraudulent activity must be
“in connection with the purchase or sale of any security”).
83. See SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating that “the SEC’s
‘only purpose’ in adopting Rule 10b-5 was to make the same prohibitions contained in Section
17(a)—which applies in connection with the ‘offer and sale’ of a security—applicable to
‘purchasers’ of securities as well” (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463
(2d Cir. 1952); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968)).
84. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299.
85. Id. at 2303.
86. See Langevoort, supra note 10, at 941 (“For all these reasons . . . we are being told what
‘make’ means in the context of private securities litigation under Rule 10b-5, leaving open how it
is to be construed in the context of public enforcement.”).
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Perhaps more telling in this regard is the Court’s effort to
demonstrate the ultimate authority rule’s consistency with prior
holdings designed to preserve requirements applicable only to actions
brought by private parties. The concerns regarding various aspects of
87
transaction causation—that is, reliance —that guided the Court’s
decisions in Central Bank and Stoneridge fit poorly with SEC
enforcement actions in which causality is not a predicate to
88
establishing a violation. Further, in SEC actions there need not be
any concern that “a broader reading of ‘make’ . . . would substantially
undermine Central Bank[’s]” prohibition on aiding-and-abetting
89
liability because the SEC enjoys Congress’s explicit blessing to bring
90
suits against aiders and abettors under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Thus, reading “make” more broadly when the SEC is the plaintiff
would not upset Central Bank’s holding that “Rule 10b-5’s private
91
right of action does not include suits against aiders and abettors.”
Similarly inapplicable to SEC actions is the Court’s concern that
without the ultimate authority requirement reliance could be
bypassed because “it is not ‘necessary or inevitable’ that any
92
falsehood will be contained in the statement.” Liability could not be
imposed in contravention of Stoneridge’s “necessary or inevitable”
reliance-driven requirement when the SEC is the plaintiff because,
again, the SEC need not prove such elements.
That Janus’s ultimate authority rule “follows from” holdings that
93
do not even affect the SEC’s enforcement authority, and that were
significantly influenced by the need to preserve a requirement that
the SEC is not required to prove, lends further credence to the
argument that the Court was construing “make” within the realm of
94
private securities litigation.

87. Because reliance has long been conceptualized as requiring “but for” causation, the
reliance requirement has been alternatively termed transaction causation. Donald C.
Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A Duty-Based Approach to Reliance and ThirdParty Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2131 n.20 (2010).
88. See HAZEN, supra note 26, § 12.10 (“Reliance is an element of a private suit under Rule
10b-5, but not in enforcement actions brought by the government.”).
89. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302
90. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012); see
also Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (“Such [aiding-and-abetting] suits may be brought by the SEC.”).
91. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 2303.
93. Id. at 2302 (stating that the ultimate authority rule “follows from” Central Bank).
94. See Langevoort, supra note 87, at 2127–28 (stating in his analysis of Stonebridge that
the “Court’s choice of reliance as the crucial element indicates the Court’s comfort with having
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Additionally, the policy concerns that lead the Janus Court to
acknowledge the “narrow scope” it must give the implied private
right of action are nonexistent when the SEC is the plaintiff. One
chief driver behind the Court’s desire to avoid expanding the scope of
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is that private litigation
under these provisions “presents a danger of vexatiousness different
in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in
95
general.” Expanding the scope of liability under Rule 10b-5 presents
more occasion for nuisance or strike suits—“meritless suits brought
by class action plaintiffs’ lawyers to extort settlement and attorneys’
96
fees” —a concern present only when private parties are the
97
plaintiffs. This concern has influenced the Court’s interpretation of
Rule 10b-5 as far back as 1975, when in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
98
Drug Stores the Court cited this concern to support limiting standing
in private Rule 10b-5 suits to actual “purchasers” or “sellers” within
99
the definitions of the Exchange Act. Central Bank echoed this
concern in restricting the scope of Rule 10b-5 by interpreting Section
100
10(b) as not permitting liability for aiders and abettors, as did

different liability outcomes in Rule 10b-5 cases depending on whether the action is an SEC
enforcement or criminal prosecution (where reliance is not required) or private litigation
(where it is)”).
95. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 189
(1994) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975)).
96. Amanda M. Rose, Life After SLUSA: What Is the Fate of Holding Claims?, 69 DEF.
COUNS. J. 455, 455 (2002). The Court articulated this threat in Blue Chip Stamps:
[E]ven a complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of
success at trial has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its
prospect of success at trial so long as he may prevent the suit from being resolved
against him by dismissal or summary judgment. The very pendency of the lawsuit may
frustrate or delay normal business activity of the defendant which is totally unrelated
to the lawsuit.
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740.
97. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740 (expressing concern for “the danger of vexatious
litigation which could result from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5,”
including the “potential for nuisance or ‘strike’ suits”).
98. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
99. Id. at 748–49; see also Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform:
Restructuring The Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1320 (2008) (noting that the Court’s decision in Blue Chip Stamps to
“deny[] standing to enforce Rule 10b-5 to nonpurchasers and nonsellers of securities . . . was
explicitly motivated by a concern about ‘strike suits’”).
100. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 188–90 (expressing that private litigation under Rule 10b-5
presents “a danger of vexatiousness” (quoting Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 739) and “requires
secondary actors to expend large sums even for pretrial defense and the negotiation of
settlements”).
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101

Stoneridge. This anti-strike-suit justification for narrowing the scope
of who can be prosecuted as a primary participant, however, does not
support limiting the SEC’s enforcement authority because, notably,
the SEC lacks the attorneys’ fee incentives that encourage strike suits
102
in the first place.
Finally, the additional policy considerations of judicial restraint
and legislative primacy, both of which influenced the Court’s
decisions in the cases cited in support of Janus’s rule, are concerns
unique to suits brought under the implied private right of action. As
Stoneridge emphasized, “Concerns with the judicial creation of a
private cause of action caution against its expansion. The decision to
103
extend the cause of action is for Congress, not for us.” Even further,
expanding the “implied private right of action” directly “conflicts
with the authority of Congress under Art. III to set the limits of
104
federal jurisdiction.” But these concerns dissipate when Congress
105
has in fact expressly authorized the action, prompting the Fourth
Circuit to note that “[e]xplicit congressional prohibitions simply
106
operate in a different universe than the one inhabited by Janus.”
Indeed, the Court has not expressed similar skepticism against
expansion of the SEC’s enforcement authority, which is expressly
107
provided for under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.

101. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 163–64 (2008)
(listing the policy concerns supporting the Court’s interpretation, including that expanding the
scope of Section 10(b)’s private right of action could extend its coverage into the realm of
ordinary business operations, thus shifting securities offerings away from U.S. capital markets,
and that “extensive discovery and the potential for uncertainty and disruption in a lawsuit could
allow plaintiffs with weak claims to extort settlements from innocent companies”).
102. See SEC v. Steffes, F. Supp. 2d 601, 617 n.12 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“Whereas private parties
have a financial incentive to initiate ‘strike’ suits and drag deep-pocketed defendants into court
on allegations of fraud in hopes of obtaining a lucrative settlement, the SEC’s statutory task is
to protect the investing public by policing the securities markets and preventing fraud.” (quoting
SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 119 (1st Cir. 2008))).
103. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165 (citing Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 173; Va. Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1102 (1991)).
104. Id. at 164–65 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 746–47 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)); see also id. at 164 (stating that expanding the scope of the implied private right of
action “runs contrary to the established principle that the jurisdiction of the federal courts is
carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation” (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at
747)).
105. See Prousalis v. Moore, 751 F.3d 272, 278 (4th Cir. 2014) (analyzing the policy concerns
of judicial restraint and legislative primacy that underlay Janus’s interpretation).
106. Id.
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2012) (giving the SEC authority to, among other things, initiate
investigations into violation, and bring suit to enjoin “any person [who] is engaged or is about to
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At least one court of appeals has used Janus’s reliance on
private-action precedent to confine the ultimate authority rule to
private actions. The Fourth Circuit directly addressed the
applicability of Janus to nonprivate Rule 10b-5(b) misrepresentation
108
claims, albeit in a unique context. In Prousalis v. Moore the Fourth
Circuit held that a federal prisoner seeking habeas relief on the
grounds that the conduct for which he was convicted is no longer
109
criminal could not find refuge in Janus. Thomas Prousalis was a
securities lawyer who pled guilty to securities fraud, including a Rule
110
10b-5(b) misstatement claim. Following Janus, Prousalis sought
habeas relief, contending that Janus rendered the conduct for which
he was convicted no longer criminal because he did not “make” the
111
false statements within the meaning of the ultimate authority rule.
The Fourth Circuit held that Janus’s interpretation of “make” was
“inapplicable outside the context of the 10b-5 implied private right of
action,” and therefore did not affect Prousalis’s criminal
112
convictions. The Fourth Circuit overcame the fact that Janus’s
holding rested significantly on a straightforward textual interpretation
of “make” by noting that the meaning of even plain statutory
113
language depends on “context.” To apply Janus’s definition of
“make” outside the context present there “would render the Supreme
114
Court’s discussion of private rights of action largely superfluous.”

engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any provision of this chapter, the rules or
regulations thereunder”); 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (2015) (“The Commission may, in its discretion,
make such formal investigations and authorize the use of process as it deems necessary to
determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or is about to violate any provision of
the federal securities laws . . . .”). Also, the SEC can, in its discretion, take one or more of the
following actions: “Institution of administrative proceedings looking to the imposition of
remedial sanctions, initiation of injunctive proceedings in the courts, and, in the case of a willful
violation, reference of the matter to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution.” Id.
§ 202.5(b).
108. Prousalis v. Moore, 751 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 2014).
109. Id. at 273.
110. Id. at 273–74. The U.S. Code subjects certain violators of Rule 10b-5 to criminal
penalties. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (“Any person who willfully violates any provision of this
chapter . . . or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful . . . shall
upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or
both . . . .”).
111. Prousalis, 751 F.3d at 275.
112. Id. at 276.
113. Id. at 277–78 (quoting King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991)).
114. Id. at 278.
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The Fourth Circuit thus concluded that Janus was construing the
115
private right of action, as opposed to the Rule itself.
Despite the Fourth Circuit’s framing of Janus and pervasive
language to the contrary, history hints that Janus should not be read
116
as limited to private litigation. Congress has acted swiftly in the past
to “reestablish the SEC’s broader enforcement authority” following
opinions that, like Janus, resulted from textual interpretations shaped
by the desire to constrain the implied private right of action under
117
Rule 10b-5. For example, following Central Bank’s dispensing of
aiding-and-abetting liability in a private suit brought under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, Congress in 1995 explicitly provided the SEC
118
with the ability to prosecute such actors. Similarly, the Court’s
119
holding in Morrison v. National Australia Bank —another privateright-of-action case—that Rule 10b-5 does not apply to transactions
120
occurring outside the United States’ borders prompted Congress to
121
provide the SEC with broader extraterritorial jurisdiction. Such
reactions support two separate inferences, both leading to the same
result: reading the Court’s textual interpretations in Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 implied private-action cases as applying to the SEC is
nothing new.

115. Id.; see also Mary P. Hansen, Fourth Circuit Holds Supreme Court’s Janus Rule Not
Applicable to Criminal Cases, NAT’L L. REV. (May 19, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/
article/fourth-circuit-holds-supreme-court-s-janus-ruling-not-applicable-criminal-cases [http://
perma.cc/BTQ2-4FAW] (“Given the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on the lack of any indication that
the U.S. Supreme Court intended for Janus to extend beyond private actions, Prousalis may
signal a victory not only for criminal prosecutors, but also for the SEC.”).
116. See Langevoort, supra note 10, at 939 (looking to historical cases to determine whether
Janus can be limited to private actions).
117. Id.
118. See supra note 90. Congress’s preference for affording the SEC broader enforcement
authority than that of private litigants is illustrated by the fact that former SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt testified before the Senate Securities Subcommittee, cited Central Bank, and
recommended that aiding-and-abetting liability in private claims be established. Abandonment
of the Private Right of Action for Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud/Staff Report on Private
Securities Litigation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous.,
& Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 13–14 (1994) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Securities
and Exchange Commission) [hereinafter Private Right of Action Hearing].
119. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
120. Id. at 273.
121. See generally Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Provision: Was it Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195 (2011) (discussing
in depth the Morrison decision and Congress’s response of broadening SEC extraterritorial
jurisdiction through Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act).
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One explanation is that Congress’s quick nullification of the
holdings in Central Bank and Morrison as applied to the SEC
evidences Congress’s own acceptance that these holdings applied with
equal force to the Commission. Another explanation is that Congress
acted as it did due to the Court’s willingness in the past to extend its
text-based holdings to the SEC. In this vein, Congress’s reactions
represent its conclusion that the Court would likely apply these
holdings to the SEC as well. This latter explanation finds support in
122
the Court’s decision in Aaron v. SEC to extend its text-based
123
holding in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder to SEC actions, thus
requiring the SEC to prove in any Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
124
enforcement actions that the defendant acted with scienter. Either
way, reading private-action cases with holdings based on textual
interpretations—a class of which Janus is a member—“as not limited
to private litigation, notwithstanding extensive language in the
125
opinion to the contrary, may be becoming a habit.” This seems
especially true given that the Court has not hesitated in the past to
explicitly reserve the question of whether its textual interpretations in
126
private actions apply to the SEC, as it did in Ernst & Ernst.
Indeed, that the SEC itself has conceded that Janus applies to
SEC actions brought under Rule 10b-5(b) speaks to the weakness of
127
arguments for its inapplicability. Thus, unless and until the SEC or
Congress demonstrates that it did not intend for the SEC to be so
122. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
123. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
124. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 701–02. The Court in Aaron described Ernst & Ernst as holding
“that a private cause of action for damages will not lie under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the
absence of an allegation of scienter.” Id. at 689. And in Ernst & Ernst the Court expressly
reserved the question of whether the SEC, like private plaintiffs, needs to prove scienter. See
Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (“Since this case concerns an action for damages we also
need not consider the question whether scienter is a necessary element in an action for
injunctive relief under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”); see also Aaron, 446 U.S. at 685 (stating that in
Ernst & Ernst, the Court “expressly reserved the question whether scienter must be alleged in a
suit for injunctive relief brought by the Commission”).
125. Langevoort, supra note 10, at 939.
126. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
127. See, e.g., SEC v. Brown, 878 F. Supp. 2d 109, 122 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting the SEC’s
concession that “as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus, the Second Claim for
Relief against [the defendant] can no longer rest on violations of subsection Rule 10b-5(b)”);
SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The SEC concedes that Janus
foreclosed its ability to assert a misstatement claim under subsection (b) of rule 10b-5 against
[the defendants].”); SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11–00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 1, 2011) (“[N]o one argues that claim one should be dismissed entirely as to either
defendant after Janus.”).
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128

bound, the Commission must deal with the narrow scope now given
to its authority to pursue primary participants for misrepresentations
perpetrated in connection with the purchase of securities on the
secondary markets.
In this regard, one plausible reason for the Court’s choice of
interpretative methodology in Janus—relying on private-action
precedent to narrowly interpret the text of a Rule equally applicable
to the SEC—is that it sought to spur the SEC or Congress into
129
clarifying its intent via amendment to Rule 10b-5(b). Such an
approach would be in line with the Court’s decisions in Central Bank
and Morrison, both of which were quickly followed by congressional
130
action.
This explanation for Janus’s unusual methodology also makes
sense considering the context of Rule 10b-5’s adoption. Indeed, “the
SEC’s ‘only purpose’ in adopting Rule 10b-5 was to make the same
prohibitions contained in Section 17(a)—which applies in connection
with the ‘offer and sale’ of a security—applicable to ‘purchasers’ of
131
securities as well.” As one of the Rule’s authors recounted about its
creation: “I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I
put them together, and the only discussion we had there was where
132
‘in connection with the purchase or sale’ should be . . . .” If the SEC
truly meant for Rule 10b-5(b) to serve the same function as Section
17(a)(2) but in connection with the purchase of securities, it would
not have intended Rule 10b-5(b) to cover a much narrower subset of

128. See infra Part IV (discussing actions the SEC or Congress can take to reinstate
equilibrium in the former’s ability to prosecute fraudsters for misrepresentations occurring in
the “offer and sale” of a security, and those occurring in subsequent “purchase or sale” of a
security on the secondary markets).
129. See Langevoort, supra note 10, at 942 (“That may be the Court’s goal [in Janus],
invoking something akin to a penalty default interpretation, like contra proferentem in contract
law, simply to provoke the Commission or Congress to clarify its intent through an amendment
to Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.”).
130. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012) (providing the SEC with authority to pursue aiders and
abettors of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations post-Central Bank’s holding that private
Section 10(b) suits do not reach aiding-and-abetting liability); id. § 78aa(b) (providing the SEC
with broader extraterritorial jurisdiction after Morrison’s curbing of the territorial reach of the
implied private right of action); see also Langevoort, supra note 10, at 942 (stating that if Janus
is read as a penalty default interpretation to provoke Congressional or Commission action, then
“[i]n this regard, Janus bears a substantial affinity to both Central Bank and Morrison, both of
which did provoke a congressional response”).
131. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 345 (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461,
463 (2d Cir. 1952); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968)).
132. Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 BUS. LAW. 891, 922 (1967).
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conduct than Section 17(a)(2). Thus, by interpreting “make”
narrowly the Court could have been signaling that Congress or the
SEC should take action to bring the SEC’s enforcement authority
into equilibrium with regards to misrepresentations at the various
stages of securities dealings. As it stands, “the Court is effectively
saying in Janus . . . that ‘make’ was meant by the SEC to have a more
restrictive meaning than what was in the statutory text from which the
Rule was drawn,” which “is implausible given the context of the
134
Rule’s adoption.” Moreover, as developed below, post-Janus the
SEC has less ability to prosecute as primary participants those who
utilize a misrepresentation in connection with the purchase of a
security than those who do so in connection with the offer of a
security.
B. Circumventing Janus? Using Scheme Liability Under Rule 10b5(a) and (c) to Prosecute Fraud Perpetrated in Connection with
the Purchase of Securities
Such heavy emphasis on “make” necessarily raises the issue of
whether, or to what extent, Janus is restricted to subsection (b) of
Rule 10b-5. Can the SEC circumvent Janus’s ultimate authority rule
by alleging that the misrepresentation is part of a larger fraudulent
scheme under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), each of which uses different
135
verbs? Under such a theory, the SEC could “restructure [its]
complaints to allege schemes to defraud or deceptive acts and
136
Since
practices rather than misrepresentations or omissions.”
subsections (a) and (c) apply to the purchase of securities, such a
tactic would curb Janus’s effect of drastically reducing the pool of
available primary participants in misrepresentations perpetrated at
that stage of securities dealings.
Such tactics, however, are likely to fail, and indeed have failed.
Even before Janus, lower courts “routinely rejected the SEC’s
attempt[s] to bypass the elements necessary to impose ‘misstatement’
liability under subsection (b) by labeling the alleged misconduct a

133. See SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing SEC v. Tambone,
550 F.3d 106, 127 (1st Cir. 2008)) (stating that Section 17(a)(2)’s language “plainly covers a
broader range of activity” than does Rule 10b-5(b)).
134. Langevoort, supra note 10, at 940.
135. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c) (2015). These verbs are “engage” and “employ,”
respectively.
136. Langevoort, supra note 10, at 963.
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‘scheme’ rather than a ‘misstatement.’” These courts were cognizant
of the temptation to resort to “something akin to scheme liability to
re-litigate issues foreclosed under a straightforward misrepresentation
138
claim” and thus refused to allow subsections (a) and (c) to be used
as a “back door into liability” for those who could not be proven to be
139
primary participants in a misrepresentation under subsection (b).
This trend continued in the period after Janus. For example, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York declined to
allow the SEC to avoid Janus by alleging scheme liability where the
purpose and effect of the scheme was to make a public
140
misrepresentation or omission. The SEC, finding no refuge in
subsections (a) and (c), thus appears relegated to using Rule 10b-5(b)
to pursue claims for misrepresentations made in connection with the
purchase of securities. But the SEC has not gone silently into the
141
night on this issue.
C. Janus’s Impact on the SEC’s Ability to Prosecute Fraud
Perpetrated in Connection with the Offer of Securities: Section
17(a)(2) of the Securities Act
Post-Janus, an important incongruence has arisen with respect to
the SEC’s authority to bring enforcement actions for
misrepresentations in connection with the offer of securities under
the Securities Act and in connection with the purchase of securities
under the Exchange Act. This incongruence results from the
137. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 343; see also, e.g., Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161,
177 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[W]here the sole basis for [market manipulation] claims is alleged
misrepresentations or omissions, plaintiffs have not made out a market manipulation claim
under Rule 10b–5(a) and (c) . . . .”); SEC v. Lucent Techs., 610 F. Supp. 2d 342, 359–61 (D.N.J.
2009) (holding that the SEC “cannot breathe new life into the defunct primary liability claims”
by asserting a scheme claim based on misrepresentations); SEC v. KPMG LLP, 412 F. Supp. 2d
349, 377–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Because the core misconduct is in fact a misstatement, it would
be improper to impose primary liability on Yoho by designating the alleged fraud a
‘manipulative device’ rather than a ‘misstatement.’”); SEC v. PIMCO Advisors Fund Mgmt.,
341 F. Supp. 2d 454, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (declining to find scheme liability where “the only
allegations at issue relate to publication of material misrepresentations or omissions”).
138. Langevoort, supra note 10, at 965.
139. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also
Langevoort, supra note 10, at 966 (stating that the courts that have considered the question held
that “complaints about misrepresentations . . . must be treated as such, no matter which prong
of the rule is invoked”).
140. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 343.
141. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the SEC’s recent interpretation of Rule 10b-5(a) and
(c) scheme liability as permitting prosecution of misrepresentations that also fall within Rule
10b-5(b)).
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differences between Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act and Rule
142
10b-5(b) promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
Section 17(a)(2), like Rule 10b-5(b), prohibits misrepresentations;
but, instead of prohibiting making an untrue statement, Section
17(a)(2) prohibits obtaining money or property “by means of any
143
untrue statement.” Despite this difference, split has developed
among lower courts as to the applicability of Janus’s ultimate
authority rule to Section 17(a)(2) enforcement actions brought by the
SEC.
The majority of courts confronted with the opportunity to import
Janus’s interpretation of “make” to Section 17(a)(2)’s “by means of”
144
language in SEC enforcement actions have declined the invitation.
145
For example, in SEC v. Stoker the defendant moved to dismiss the
SEC’s Section 17(a)(2) claim, arguing, inter alia, that Janus applied to

142. Courts have interpreted the textual differences between Rules 10b-5(b) and Section
17(a)(2) in a manner resulting in the latter capturing a broader range of conduct than the former
even pre-Janus. See, e.g., SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating that
Section 17(a)(2)’s language “plainly covers a broader range of activity” than does Rule 10b5(b)). Additionally, Section 17(a)(2) has long required only a showing of negligence, whereas a
Rule 10b-5 violation requires a showing of scienter. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701–02 (1980).
Lastly, following Central Bank courts developed two primary tests for determining who made a
statement within the meaning of 10b-5(b) so as to be liable as a primary participant. One such
test, the bright-line attribution test, required that a statement be attributed to the party in order
for that party to be a primary participant. See Pac. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d
144, 148 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Absent attribution, plaintiffs cannot show that they relied on
defendants’ own false statements, and participation in creation of those statements amounts, at
most, to aiding and abetting . . . .”). But see In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d
615, 628–29 (9th Cir. 1994) (utilizing the alternative substantial participation test and allowing
culpability for false statements where a party substantially participated in the preparation of the
statements).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2012).
144. See, e.g., SEC v. Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., No. 07-C-4684, 2012 WL 1079961, at *15 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 20, 2012) (finding Janus inapplicable to Section 17(a) claims due to the differences in
wording between Rule 10b-5 and Section 17(a), and because the policy concerns regarding
implied private rights of action underlying Janus are not present in Section 17(a) actions); SEC
v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt., 844 F. Supp. 2d 377, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Nor does Janus apply to
SEC enforcement claims pursuant to Section 17(a) of the Securities Act.”), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, 725 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2013); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. 5:07–cv–02822–
WHA, 2011 WL 5871020, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (“This Court agrees with those
decisions that have concluded that Janus may not be extended to statutes lacking the very
language that Janus construed.”); SEC v. Geswein, No. 5:10CV1235, 2011 WL 4565861, at *2
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2011) (declining to extend Janus to a Section 17(a) claim because the
provision lacks the term “make”); SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11–00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295130, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011) (same).
145. SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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146

claims brought under Section 17(a). The court, however, held
otherwise for two main reasons, the first being textual, the second
purposive. The court noted that proving a violation of Rule 10b-5 and
Sections 17(a)(1)–(3) requires proof of essentially the same elements,
but nonetheless concluded that differences in the language dictate
147
different results. Although Janus undertook a textual analysis of the
word “make,” concluding it means “to state,” Section 17(a)(2)
prohibits obtaining money “by means of,” that is “by use,” of an
148
untrue statement. Thus, according to the court, Section 17(a)(2)’s
language “plainly covers a broader range of activity” than does Rule
10b-5(b) because a defendant is liable under Section 17(a)(2) if he
“obtains money or property by use of a false statement, whether
149
prepared by himself or by another.” Second, the court highlighted
that Janus’s ultimate authority rule resulted from the need to read
Rule 10b-5 narrowly due to the concerns attendant to implied private
150
rights of action. In contrast, Section 17(a)(2) does not give rise to
such concerns because Section 17(a) does not support a private right
151
of action, explicitly or implicitly.
Notwithstanding the absence of “make” in Section 17(a)(2), at
least one court has held that Janus does in fact restrict the SEC’s
152
enforcement authority under Section 17(a)(2). The first case to
153
apply Janus to Section 17(a) of the Securities Act was SEC v. Kelly.
The court first acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Janus did
not address liability under Section 17(a), but then noted that
numerous courts have held that the elements of Section 17(a) and

146. Id. at 464.
147. Id. at 464–65 (citing Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695–97 (1980)).
148. Id. at 464 (citing SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 127 (1st Cir. 2008)). In Tambone, the
First Circuit held that under Section 17(a)(2), “[l]iability attaches so long as the statement is
used ‘to obtain money or property,’ regardless of its source.” Tambone, 550 F.3d at 127.
149. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 465 (citing Tambone, 550 F.3d at 127).
150. Id. (citing Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302
(2011)).
151. Id. (citing Finkel v. Stratton Corp., 962 F.3d 169, 174 (2d Cir. 1992)).
152. See, e.g., SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Because subsection
(2) of Section 17(a) and subjection (b) of Rule 10b–5 are treated similarly, it would be
inconsistent for Janus to require that a defendant have made the misleading statement to be
liable under subsection (b) . . . but not under subsection (2) . . . .”); SEC v. Perry, No. CV-111309 R, 2012 WL 1959566 at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2012) (citing Kelly with approval in finding
that Janus applies to Section 17(a) claims).
153. SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Strangely, the Stoker court’s only
acknowledgement of Kelly’s earlier and opposite holding is a single “but see” citation. Stoker,
865 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
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Rule 10b-5 claims are “essentially the same.” The court further
reasoned that “the SEC’s ‘only purpose’ in adopting Rule 10b-5 was
to make the same prohibitions contained in Section 17(a)—which
applies in connection with the ‘offer and sale’ of a security—
155
applicable to ‘purchasers’ of securities as well.” Although not
directly addressing the absence of “make” in Section 17(a)’s text, the
court broadly concluded that because Section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5
are similarly focused they should be interpreted in the same manner
156
with respect to the scope of primary liability. Because succeeding on
a misrepresentation claim under either provision requires that “the
SEC . . . prove the defendant made materially false statements or
157
omissions,” inconsistency would result if the SEC had to prove that
the defendant made the misleading statement per Janus in Rule 10b-5
actions, but not have to prove that the defendant made the misleading
158
statement per Janus in Section 17(a)(2) actions. As a result, the
court essentially imported “make” into the Securities Act’s antifraud
provision and dismissed the case because the SEC had not plead that
159
the defendants made any misleading statements.
One aspect noticeably absent from the court’s analysis in Kelly is
any consideration of the policy concerns that guided the Supreme
Court’s interpretation in Janus, and whether such concerns are
160
present when the SEC is the plaintiff. Not only are the concerns
attendant to implied private rights of action—that is, judicial
restraint, legislative primacy, and vexatious litigation—absent in SEC
enforcement actions, but a court interpreting Section 17(a)(2) would
have no need to interpret it narrowly to conform with private-action
precedent as the Supreme Court did in Janus. Because Section

154. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 345 (citing SEC v. Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 308
(2d Cir. 1999); SEC v. First Jersey Sec. Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1467 (2d Cir. 1996); SEC v. Tex. Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 n.22 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC v. Power, 525 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419
(S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
155. Id. (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952); Tex. Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 855).
156. Id.
157. Id. (citing SEC v. McGinn, Smith & Co., 752 F. Supp. 2d 194, 212–13 (N.D.N.Y. 2010);
SEC v. Glob. Telecom Servs., LLC, 325 F. Supp. 2d 94, 111 (D. Conn. 2004); SEC v. Espuelas,
699 F. Supp. 2d 655, 659–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See SEC v. Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., No. 07 C 4684, 2012 WL 1079961, at *15 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 20, 2012) (“However, the court in Kelly did not expressly consider the policy reasons
underlying the Janus decision, and we are therefore unpersuaded by the court’s reasoning.”).
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17(a)(2) does not include a private right of action, the provision need
not be interpreted narrowly to preserve a reliance requirement. Nor
is there a need to interpret it narrowly to preserve a previous
prohibition on aiding-and-abetting liability given that the SEC is
expressly authorized to pursue aiders and abettors of Section 17(a)
161
primary violations. And though the SEC may need to prove that the
defendant made materially false statements or omissions under both
Section 17(a)(2) and Rule 10b-5(b), Section 17(a)(2)’s “by means of”
language could, as the court in Stoker found, nonetheless be
interpreted as covering a broader range of conduct than Rule 10b5(b)’s “make.” Just as the presence of “make” in Rule 10b-5(b) works
to bind the SEC to Janus’s interpretation, the absence of “make” in
Section 17(a)(2) saves the SEC from Janus’s constraints.
Additionally, the court in Kelly was correct that “the SEC’s ‘only
purpose’ in adopting Rule 10b-5 was to make the same prohibitions
contained in Section 17(a)—which applies in connection with the
‘offer and sale’ of a security—applicable to ‘purchasers’ of securities
162
as well.” This recognition, however, should not have spurred the
court to likewise constrain Section 17(a)(2) as Janus does Rule 10b5(b). Rather, this recognition better supports the previously stated
idea that the Supreme Court interpreted “make” as it did to provoke
the SEC or Congress into amending Rule 10b-5(b) to match the
broader Section 17(a)(2). Rule 10b-5(b)’s roots in Section 17(a)(2)
should not be taken for the opposite suggestion, that the latter should
be interpreted to match the narrower formulation of the former. As
shown below, Congress has been explicit in its preference for broad
SEC enforcement authority.
D. Janus’s Impact on the SEC’s Enforcement Authority Under
Section 17(a)(2) and Congressional Intent
Congress’s attitude towards both the SEC’s enforcement
authority and the scope of implied private rights of action under the
securities laws also bear on the issue. Congress has repeatedly
expanded the SEC’s enforcement powers while simultaneously

161. See 15 U.S.C. § 77o(b) (2012) (“[A]ny person that knowingly or recklessly provides
substantial assistance to another person in violation of a provision of this subchapter, or of any
rule or regulation issued under this subchapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such
provision to the same extent” as the primary participant).
162. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 345 (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461,
463 (2d Cir. 1952); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968)).
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working, with the help of the Supreme Court, to limit the scope of
private actions. This supports an inference that Congress would not
want the SEC’s enforcement authority under Section 17(a)(2), which
lacks both Rule 10b-5(b)’s language and the policy concerns that
accompany private actions, to be limited by Janus.
In 1990, Congress vastly augmented the SEC’s enforcement
powers when it enacted the Securities Enforcement Remedies and
163
Penny Stock Reform Act (Remedies Act) “in order to provide
additional enforcement remedies for violations” of the federal
164
securities laws. In particular, the Remedies Act was designed to
“strengthen the enforcement powers of the . . . SEC and provide
the agency with a broader range of remedies to protect investors and
165
maintain the integrity of the nation’s securities markets.” Before the
Remedies Act’s enactment, the SEC had limited authority to obtain
166
financial penalties outside of insider-trading violations. Due to the
167
perceived inadequacy of the SEC’s enforcement tools,
the
Remedies Act significantly expanded the sanctions available to the
168
169
SEC by amending various federal securities laws to provide the
SEC with four new classes of remedies: cease and desist authority,
163. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
164. Id. at 931. For an in depth discussion of the Remedies Act, see generally Ralph C.
Ferrara, Thomas A. Ferrigno & David S. Darland, Hardball! The SEC’s New Arsenal of
Enforcement Weapons, 47 BUS. LAW. 33 (1991). For a look at postenactment developments, see
generally Richard A. Spehr & Michelle J. Annunziata, The Remedies Act Turns Fifteen: What Is
Its Relevance Today?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 587 (2005).
165. S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 1 (1990). Likewise, the House Report for the Remedies Act
stated it would provide the SEC “with new remedial authority that will enable the agency to
operate its enforcement program in a more flexible manner.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 13
(1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1380.
166. Spehr & Annunziata, supra note 164, at 588.
167. See Ferrara et al., supra note 164, at 35–36 (discussing the perceived limitations on SEC
enforcement authority and stating that injunctions were “ineffective with respect to certain
offenders and particularly onerous for others,” and disgorgement “merely required the
wrongdoer to return the benefits of the illegal conduct and, thus, did not have a sufficient
deterrent effect”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 16, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379,
1384 (“Because many of the charges in the most prominent securities fraud cases of the 1980’s
have involved violations other than insider trading, the Commission believes that it needs the
additional authority contained in [the Remedies Act] to attack the full range of fraudulent
activity in the securities markets.”).
168. Spehr & Annunziata, supra note 164, at 588.
169. These include the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2012); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2012); and Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21
(2012).
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civil penalties, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and officer and
170
director bars.
Five years after significantly expanding the SEC’s enforcement
authority, and one year after the Supreme Court held in a private
action that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not support aiding-andabetting liability, Congress acted yet again to expand the SEC’s
enforcement power and also to curtail the reach of private securities
litigation. Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform
171
Act of 1995 (PSLRA) in an effort to deter frivolous securities class
172
actions (that is, strike suits). The PSLRA heightened private
173
plaintiffs’ pleading requirements and permitted the imposition of
sanctions on attorneys who file securities-fraud class-action suits
determined to be frivolous following mandatory judicial review of the
174
suit. Significantly, Congress declined the former SEC Chairman’s
request to provide for aiding-and-abetting liability in private Section
175
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims following Central Bank,
while

170. See Spehr & Annunziata, supra note 164, at 588–94 (explaining each class of new
remedies).
171. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
172. See OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE
SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995, at 5–6 (stating that the PSLRA “was intended
to address concerns that had been raised about abuses believed to be associated with securities
class actions”); see also Sharon Nelles & Hilary Huber, Pleading Securities Fraud Claims: The
Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 653, 653–54 (2014) (“The purpose of the
PSLRA was to ‘prevent an onslaught of expensive and frivolous lawsuits when stock prices
plummet, which could force corporations to settle meritless claims to avoid the expense of
discovery and trial.’” (quoting In re Accelr8 Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053–
54 (D. Colo. 2001))).
173. Nelles & Huber, supra note 172, at 656; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (2012)
(requiring a plaintiff alleging securities fraud based on misleading statements or omissions of
material facts to “specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons
why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is
made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which
that belief is formed”).
174. Nelles & Huber, supra note 172, at 659 (“[T]he PSLRA requires courts to conduct a
Rule 11 inquiry upon final adjudication of the suit. If the court determines that compliance with
Rule 11 is lacking, then it must impose sanctions on the plaintiff for filing a frivolous suit.”).
175. See Private Right of Action Hearing, supra note 118, at 13–14 (statement of Arthur
Levitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission) (“Legislation is also needed to restore
aiding and abetting liability in private actions which are a necessary supplement to our overall
enforcement program.”).
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simultaneously bestowing upon the SEC the power to pursue such
176
actors.
This decision demonstrates Congress’s preference for expansion
of SEC enforcement authority over that of private litigants. Despite
this preference, this decision also supports that reading cases such as
Central Bank, Morrison, and Janus “as not limited to private
litigation, notwithstanding extensive language to the contrary, may be
177
becoming a habit.” That is, Congress likely provided the SEC with
authority to pursue aiders and abettors in anticipation that Central
Bank’s holding would be applied to constrain the scope of the SEC’s
enforcement authority. The same is true of Congress providing the
SEC with broader extraterritorial jurisdiction under Rule 10b-5
following the Court’s interpretation of the Rule in Morrison as not
reaching transactions occurring outside U.S. borders. Such inferred
congressional acceptance of the applicability of Central Bank and
Morrison to SEC enforcement actions suggests that Congress may
view the Supreme Court’s textual interpretations of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 in private actions as applying to SEC suits. By virtue of
this precedent, Congress would likely view Janus’s textual
interpretation of Rule 10b-5(b) as applying to SEC actions brought
under the Rule because the same text is present. This same inference,
though, cannot be drawn with regards to Janus’s applicability to
Section 17(a)(2), which lacks the language that Congress could
conclude binds the SEC by virtue of Janus.
The PSLRA’s passage, however, shows that Congress
nonetheless envisioned the availability to the SEC of a broad pool of
primary participants to prosecute under the antifraud provisions. In
Central Bank, the Court spoke to the reach of not only Section10(b),
but also Rule 10b-5(b), stating that liability does not reach aiders and
abettors because “the statute prohibits only the making of a material
178
misstatement (or omission).” A primary participant is therefore one
who “makes” a misrepresentation, at least in paragraph (b). This
malleable formulation of what makes one a primary participant
appears broader than Janus’s bright-line ultimate authority standard.
Given that the aiding-and-abetting action still needs a primary
176. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012); see
also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008)
(describing this history).
177. Langevoort, supra note 10, at 939.
178. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177
(1994).
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participant, the provision for an aiding-and-abetting action for the
SEC can be seen as predicated on Central Bank’s broader
formulation of primary participants. Although Congress may have
implicitly accepted Central Bank’s applicability to the SEC, Congress
may nonetheless have envisioned a broad scope of liability for the
aiding-and-abetting action due to the broad pool of primary
participants Central Bank’s formulation established. Congress’s intent
to provide a broad pool of primary participants from which aider-andabettor liability can be derived supports not extending Janus to
Section 17(a)(2).
Following the PSLRA’s enactment, Congress twice again
declined an invitation to give private litigants the ability to sue aiders
and abettors of primary violations of the federal securities laws while
simultaneously expanding the SEC’s enforcement authority. First, in
179
passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley),
180
Congress denied aiding-and-abetting liability to private litigants but
enhanced the remedies and sanctions available in SEC injunctive
181
actions. Later, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
182
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Congress considered and
183
rejected a bill to extend primary liability to aiders and abettors
while expanding the SEC’s authority to prosecute such secondary
184
actors under the Securities Act. Such a preference for the continued

179. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as
amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–7266 and scattered sections of 11, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
180. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-414, at 53–54 (2002) (providing the minority view that
“[a]lthough the [PSLRA] partially overturned the Central Bank of Denver decision by restoring
some of the SEC’s authority to pursue aiders and abettors of securities fraud, that legislation
failed to give the victims of fraud the right to sue those who aid issuers in misleading and
defrauding the public”).
181. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012) (permitting the SEC to freeze extraordinary
payments to any of the listed persons during the course of a lawful investigation involving
possible violations of the federal securities laws); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 305(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78u (2012) (changing the standard for using officer and director bars in federal court
actions from “substantial unfitness” to “unfitness”); id. § 308(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2012)
(allowing the SEC to combine civil penalties with disgorgement funds).
182. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S. Code)
183. See Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violation Act of 2009, S. 1551, 111th
Cong. (2009) (proposing a private civil right of action for aiding and abetting as part of DoddFrank); Alexander C. Krueger-Wyman, Note, Making a Statement About Private Securities
Litigation: The Merits and Implications of the Supreme Court’s Janus Capital Case, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1621, 1639 (2014) (discussing the bill).
184. Dodd-Frank § 929M, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (2012) (providing the SEC authority to pursue
aiders and abettors of violations of the Securities Act); see also id. § 929O, 15 U.S.C. § 78t

GAUGHT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/22/2015 6:15 PM

558

[Vol. 65:527

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

expansion of SEC authority to combat fraud under the securities laws
intimates Congress’s intent not to have this authority narrowed by
applying Janus to Section 17(a)(2).
Finally, the SEC’s broad authority to obtain injunctions provides
yet another factor suggesting that Congress intended for the SEC to
have broader power than private litigants to pursue violations of the
185
federal securities laws’ antifraud provisions. Unlike suits brought by
private litigants, the purpose of an SEC injunctive proceeding “is to
186
protect the public against harm, not punish the offender.” Also
unlike private litigants seeking injunctive relief, the SEC typically is
not required to demonstrate either irreparable injury or an
187
inadequate remedy at law. Further still, the SEC need not even
prove that the defendant engaged in prohibited conduct to obtain an
injunction; the SEC must establish merely that the defendant was
“about to engage in any of the acts or practice which constitute or will
188
constitute a violation” of the antifraud provisions. Thus, not only
does Section 17(a)(2) lack the language interpreted in Janus as
narrowing the scope of primary-participant liability, the SEC’s
injunctive authority itself evidences that Congress does not desire for
the pool of primary participants pursuable by the SEC to equal that
available to private litigants.
IV. RESTORING BALANCE IN THE SEC’S ENFORCEMENT
AUTHORITY
Given Janus’s applicability to Rule 10b-5(b) misrepresentation
189
claims brought by the SEC, the question arises: What next? Claims
(2012) (changing the aiding-and-abetting standard from “knowingly” to “knowingly or
recklessly”).
185. See Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2012) (permitting the SEC to
seek an injunction “[w]henever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged in
or about to engage in any of the acts or practice which constitute or will constitute a violation of
any of the provisions of this chapter”); Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2012)
(same).
186. SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1027–28 (2d Cir. 1978).
187. See, e.g., SEC v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975) (“Unlike
private actions, which are rooted wholly in the equity jurisdiction of the federal court, SEC suits
for injunctions are ‘creatures of statutes.’ ‘(P)roof of irreparable injury or the inadequacy of
other remedies as in the usual suit for injunction’ is not required.” (alteration in original)
(citation omitted)); see also SEC v. Marker, 427 F. Supp. 2d 583, 590 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (“[T]he
Commission does not have to invoke the traditional equitable requirements for injunctive relief
to obtain an injunction . . . .”).
188. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (emphasis added).
189. See supra Part III.A.
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brought under Section 17(a)(2) provide no alternative for prosecuting
misrepresentations made in connection with the purchase of
190
securities. And pursuing such misrepresentations under a theory of
scheme liability via Rule 10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c) presents its own
191
difficulties. Until recently, preserving the SEC’s ability to equally
prosecute fraudsters during both the offer and purchase of securities
appeared to require either congressional action, such as what
occurred following Central Bank and Morrison, or the SEC’s exercise
of its rulemaking authority. But in a recent agency adjudication the
SEC interpreted its own regulations and the Securities Act in a
manner that, if deferred to by courts, could alleviate this
incongruence.
A. The SEC’s Take: In re Matter of Flannery and the SEC’s Bid for
Judicial Deference
As could be expected, the SEC has not been silent on the issue,
and for good reason. Extending Janus both to scheme liability claims
under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) and misrepresentation claims under
Section 17(a)(2) would severely curtail the SEC’s ability to pursue
perpetrators of misrepresentations at all stages of securities dealings.
The stance taken by the SEC in a recent adjudication, however,
drastically limits the possibility that Janus will be stretched beyond
Rule 10b-5(b).
192
In In re Matter of Flannery, the SEC squarely addressed Janus’s
application to Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) and Section 17(a)(2). In its
opinion, the Commission noted that Janus’s silence regarding these
provisions “creat[ed] confusion in the lower courts as to whether its
193
limitations apply to those provisions, as well.” The SEC thus relied
on its “experience and expertise in administering the securities laws”
to set out its interpretation both of Rule 10b-5’s various provisions
194
and of Section 17(a). It did so to “resolve the ambiguities in the
meaning of Rule 10b-5 and Section 17(a) that have produced
195
confusion in the courts and inconsistencies across jurisdictions.” The
190. See supra Part III.C.
191. See supra Part III.B.
192. In re Flannery, Securities Act Release No. 9689, Exchange Act Release No. 73,840,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3981, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,374, 2014
WL 7145625 (Dec. 15, 2014).
193. Id. at *10.
194. Id. at *9.
195. Id.
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SEC’s allusion to ambiguity and its explicitness in bringing to bear its
experience and expertise shows the SEC’s intent in setting out its
interpretations—a bid for judicial deference to its stance that Janus
does not apply to SEC actions brought outside Rule 10b-5(b).
Under existing administrative-law doctrines, agencies receive
deference for reasonable interpretations of ambiguities in their
196
regulations and the statutes they administer. In In re Matter of
Flannery, the SEC interpreted both its own regulations—Rule 10b5(a) and (c)—and a statute it is charged with administering—Section
17(a)(2) of the Securities Act. By doing so, courts considering Janus’s
application outside of Rule 10b-5(b) must now assess whether the
SEC’s interpretations warrant deference.
1. The SEC’s Take on Janus and Section 17(a)(2). The SEC’s
interpretation of Section 17(a)(2) might allow the SEC to avoid
Janus’s ultimate authority rule when prosecuting fraud involving
misrepresentations perpetrated in connection with the offer of
securities. Under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
197
Council, Inc., federal courts must accept an agency’s reasonable
construction of an ambiguous statute “even if the agency’s reading
differs from what the court believes is the best statutory
198
interpretation.”
In In re Flannery, the SEC concluded that “Janus’s limitation on
primary liability under Rule 10b-5(b) does not apply to claims arising
199
under Section 17(a)(2).” It did so based on the same rationale
employed by the many courts that similarly held Janus inapplicable to
Section 17(a)(2). First, Section 17(a)(2) prohibits obtaining money or
property “by means of” any untrue statement, not “making” a false
200
statement. This textual difference means Section 17(a)(2) “covers a

196. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457 (1997) (declaring that because Congress had not
directly spoken to the issue, the agency’s interpretation was to be sustained if it was based on a
permissible construction of the statute); Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (holding that if a court determines that Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court must ask whether the agency’s interpretation
is a permissible construction of the statute); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,
414 (1945) (explaining that the administrative interpretation of a regulation is controlling unless
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation).
197. Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
198. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005)
(citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44, 44 n.11.).
199. Flannery, 2014 WL 7145625, at *11 (citation omitted).
200. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2012)).
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broader range of activity than Rule 10b-5(b).” Indeed, the SEC
interpreted Section 17(a)(2)’s “by means of” requirement “to mean
that a defendant may be held primarily liable if he uses a
misstatement to obtain money or property even if he has not himself
made a false statement in connection with the offer or sale of a
202
security.” Second, the SEC reasoned that since “make” is absent
from Section 17(a)(2), “Janus’s limitation on primary liability under
Rule 10b-5(b) does not apply to claims arising under Section
203
17(a)(2).” Finally, extending Janus to Section 17(a)(2) would
undermine the Securities Act’s remedial purposes and the SEC’s
“long-held position that the securities laws ‘should be construed not
technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [those] remedial
204
purposes.’”
Judicial deference to the SEC’s interpretation of Section 17(a)(2)
will ensure that Janus does not constrain its ability to prosecute fraud
involving misrepresentations perpetrated in connection with the offer
of securities. Deferring to this interpretation will not, however,
remedy the constraint Janus placed on the SEC’s ability to prosecute
misrepresentations perpetrated in connection with the purchase of
those securities on the secondary markets.
2. The SEC’s Take on Janus and Scheme Liability Under Rule
205
10b-5(a) and (c). In Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., the
Supreme Court held that an agency’s interpretation of its own rules
“becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or
206
inconsistent with the regulation.” In In re Flannery, the SEC
interpreted Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), its own rules, and concluded that
primary liability under those provisions “also encompasses the
‘making’ of a fraudulent misstatement to investors, as well as the
207
drafting or devising of such a misstatement.” This is because,
according to the SEC, Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)’s combined prohibitions

201. Id.
202. Id. (quoting SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 127–28 (1st Cir. 2008)).
203. Id.
204. Id. (alteration in original).
205. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
206. Id. at 413–14; see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (stating that an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation contained in an amicus brief is “controlling unless
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989))).
207. Flannery, 2014 WL 7145625, at *12.
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on employment of deceptive “device[s],” “scheme[s],” and “artifice[s]
to defraud” and deceptive “act[s]” includes “making” a
208
misstatement. Thus, under the SEC’s interpretation, a party could
avoid primary liability for a misstatement under Rule 10b-5(b) if he
did not “make” the statement as defined in Janus but nonetheless be
primarily liable under subsections (a) and (c) for employing a
deceptive “device,” “scheme,” or “artifice to defraud” and engaging
209
in a deceptive “act.” This approach permits the SEC to avoid
Janus’s constraints when prosecuting fraud involving misstatements
or omissions in the purchase or sale of securities on the secondary
markets.
Although a full-blown administrative-law analysis of this
interpretation’s chances of receiving deference is beyond the scope of
this Note, one potential speed bump warrants mentioning: Seminole
Rock deference may soon be dead. Justices Scalia and Thomas both
recently expressed their desire to altogether jettison deference to
210
agency interpretations of their own regulations. Justice Alito and
Chief Justice Roberts also believe that reconsideration of Seminole
Rock/Auer deference may be appropriate when properly raised and
211
argued. As Chief Justice Roberts put it, the Court’s recent decisions
have assured that “[t]he bar is aware that there is some interest in
212
reconsidering those cases.” Now “[w]ell-advised litigants pained by
agency interpretations . . . will be teeing up the Auer question and,
when it makes tactical sense, arguing that agency interpretations
213
really are substantive rules” to which courts do not defer. If

208. See id. at *14 (“It would require a wholly arbitrary reading of those terms to construe
them as excluding the making, drafting, or devising of a misstatement.”).
209. See id. at *13 (“Accepting that a drafter is not primarily liable for ‘making’ a
misstatement under Rule 10b-5(b), our position is that the drafter would be primarily liable
under subsections (a) and (c) for employing a deceptive ‘device’ and engaging in a deceptive
‘act’.”).
210. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Thomas J., concurring)
(“I write separately because [these cases at hand] call into question the legitimacy of our
precedents requiring deference to administrative interpretations of regulations.”); id. at 1211–13
(Scalia J., concurring) (describing that in interpreting regulations, “courts [should] decide—with
no deference to the agency—whether [the agency’s] interpretation is correct”).
211. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338 (2013).
212. Id. at 1339.
213. Brian Wolfman & Bradley Girard, Opinion Analysis: The Court Slays the D.C. Circuit’s
Paralyzed Veterans Doctrine, Leaving Bigger Issues for Another Day, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 10,
2015, 9:22 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/03/opinion-analysis-the-court-slays-the-d-ccircuits-paralyzed-veterans-doctrine-leaving-bigger-issues-for-another-day [http://perma.cc/G5
CJ-632V].
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Seminole Rock/Auer deference is extinguished, the SEC’s
interpretation of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) as unaffected by Janus may
not carry the day. If it does not, the SEC would be back to having a
curtailed ability to pursue misstatements and omissions during the
purchase of securities on the secondary markets. This possibility calls
for exploration of alternative routes to alleviating Janus constraints.
B. Restoring Balance via the SEC’s Rulemaking Authority Under
Section 10(b)
Given the current congressional environment of partisan
214
gridlock, the most plausible means of restoring balance in the SEC’s
authority to prosecute misrepresentations at the varying stages of
securities dealings is through the SEC’s rulemaking authority. Given
that Janus’s applicability to SEC enforcement actions stems from the
presence of “make” in Rule 10b-5(b) regardless of the plaintiff’s
identity, the SEC could reverse Janus’s detrimental effects on
215
pursuing primary participants by amending its own rule.
Importantly, Janus did not constrain the scope of Section 10(b)—and
thus the SEC’s ability to promulgate rules under that Section—since
the opinion interpreted the text of Rule 10b-5 itself and not the
216
statutory language of Section 10(b). In deciding to bring its
misrepresentation enforcement powers into equilibrium through
exercising this rulemaking authority, the SEC has two options. The
Commission can simply amend the current Rule 10b-5(b) and discard
“make” in favor of a preferable term. Or it can leave intact the
current narrow Rule 10b-5(b) and create a new Rule 10b-5(b) to
explicitly apply only to SEC enforcement actions.
214. See Gillian E. Metzger, Appointments, Innovation, and the Judicial-Political Divide, 64
DUKE L.J. 1607, 1630–33 (2015) (“Political scientists have documented significantly increased
political polarization in Congress. The ideological gap between the two parties is growing, with
increasingly consistent party divides across a wide range of policy issues.”). Such polarization
makes “periods of divided government especially prone to conflict and stalemate.” Id. at 1632
(citation omitted).
215. The SEC has used its rulemaking authority in the past to essentially overrule a line of
cases interpreting Rule 10b-5. In 2000, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-1 to clarify whether
insider trading prohibited by Rule 10b-5 required knowing possession of material nonpublic
information, or using such information to trade. The SEC settled on the former interpretation in
Rule 10b5-1, overruling the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits’ approach requiring use of the
information. See JAMES D. COX & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
CASES AND MATERIALS 948–49 (11th ed. 2014).
216. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011)
(“For purposes of Rule 10b–5, the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate
authority over the statement . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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1. Reversing Janus’s Effects by Amending Rule 10b-5(b). The
more interesting route for the SEC to take is to amend the current
Rule 10b-5(b), resulting in a newly phrased single rule applicable to
both the SEC and private litigants. Given Rule 10b-5(b)’s roots, the
SEC could amend Rule 10b-5(b)’s language to track that of the
broader Section 17(a)(2), from which Rule 10b-5(b) was substantially
217
derived. This response would accord with the assertion that, given
Rule 10b-5(b)’s creation, the Court in Janus so interpreted Rule 10b5(b) to provoke the SEC into acting to bring its enforcement
authority under Rule 10b-5 up to par with that of its parent, Section
218
17(a).
Simply amending the current Rule 10b-5(b) carries with it the
primary benefit of preserving private enforcement as a “necessary
219
supplement to the securities fraud deterrence efforts of the SEC.”
That is, a Rule 10b-5(b) that captures the same scope of primary
participants regardless of the plaintiff’s identity allows the threat of
private litigation to serve as an added deterrent to those considering
engaging in fraudulent conduct. Amending the current Rule 10b-5(b)
to track the language of Section 17(a)(2) would therefore relieve the
SEC of Janus’s constraints on pursuing primary violators while
supplementing this broader enforcement authority with the
deterrence provided by the specter of private litigation. Indeed, that
the SEC’s amicus brief in Janus argued for a broad interpretation of
“make” hints at the SEC is content with a single rule applicable to
220
both itself and private plaintiffs. Even before Janus the SEC
recommended to Congress that aiding-and-abetting liability be
221
established in private claims following Central Bank, which would
have permitted both the SEC and private plaintiffs to pursue such
actors.

217. See supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text.
218. See supra Part III.A.
219. Rose, supra note 99, at 1301. For an argument that private enforcement results in
detrimental overdeterrence, see generally id.
220. See Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 12–17, Janus, 131 S.
Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09-525), 2010 WL 4339892 (explaining the agency’s view that a person
makes a statement if “the statement is written or spoken by him, or if he provides the false or
misleading information that another person then puts into the statement, or if he allows the
statement to be attributed to him” (citation omitted)); see also Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 & n.8
(explaining that the SEC definition would permit private plaintiffs to sue a person who provides
false information).
221. Private Right of Action Hearing, supra note 118, at 13–14 (statement of Arthur Levitt,
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).
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But taking this path to reversing Janus’s adverse effects also
eschews the notion that Congress prefers that the SEC enjoy broader
enforcement authority than do private litigants even when the actions
222
are brought under identical provisions. In this regard, the SEC
might alternatively preserve the current Rule 10b-5(b) interpreted in
Janus but also promulgate a new Rule 10b-5(b) that explicitly applies
only to the SEC.
2. Reversing Janus’s Effects by Adopting a New Rule 10b-5(b)
Applicable Only to SEC Enforcement Actions. Promulgating a new
Rule 10b-5(b) exclusive to the SEC would not only honor Congress’s
apparent desire to constrain the scope of private securities actions
while broadening the SEC’s enforcement authority, but also pander
to the Supreme Court’s concerns over implied private rights of action
223
and its desire to ensure such actions remain narrowly construed.
Moreover, this two-rule approach would alleviate the tension
following cases brought by private plaintiffs that produce
disagreement as to their applicability to SEC enforcement actions.
The Supreme Court and lower courts could freely construe the
current Rule 10b-5(b), applicable to private actions, narrowly while
interpreting the new Rule 10b-5(b), applicable to SEC actions, “not
technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
224
purposes.”
C. Restoring Balance via Congressional Action
Congressional action provides an alternative—but also less
likely—means of restoring balance in the SEC’s enforcement
authority with regards to misrepresentations under the securities
antifraud provisions. Indeed, it would not be the first time Congress
has acted to rebalance the SEC’s enforcement authority following the
Supreme Court’s textual interpretation of the Exchange Act’s
antifraud provisions. For example, following the Court’s abrogation
of aiding-and-abetting liability in Central Bank, Congress quickly

222. See supra Part III.D.
223. See, e.g., Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (“[C]oncerns with the judicial creation of a private
cause of action caution against its expansion.” (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165 (2008))); see also id. (“[W]e are mindful that we must
give ‘narrow dimensions . . . to a right of action Congress did not authorize when it first enacted
the statute and did not expand when it revisited the law.’” (alterations in original) (quoting
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 167)).
224. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
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affirmed the SEC’s ability to pursue such actors. On that occasion
Congress acted with good reason because application of Central
Bank’s holding to the SEC would bar the Commission from obtaining
226
injunctive relief against aiders and abettors. Such a result would be
a “strange anomaly” in that “the Commission’s enforcement powers
would, under the express language of the Act, be broader in actions
brought in an administrative proceeding . . . than if the same action
227
were initiated in the district court” seeking injunctive relief. But the
PSLRA, “by expressly authorizing SEC judicial enforcement of the
antifraud provision against aiders and abettors, avoids the
228
anomal[y].”
The post-Janus imbalance in the SEC’s authority to pursue as
primary participants those who materially misrepresent information
in connection with the offer of securities versus those who do so in
connection with the purchase of securities on the secondary markets
parallels the anomalous result of applying Central Bank to the SEC. It
likewise could be avoided by congressional action reversing Janus’s
narrow holding as applied to the SEC. Given the substantial
institutional constraints on congressional action, and the current
bitterly partisan state of Congress in general, times do not appear
229
conducive to such remedial action. Thus, judicial deference to the
SEC’s interpretation of scheme liability under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)
or the SEC utilizing its rulemaking authority are the more plausible
solutions to Janus’s incongruence quandary.
CONCLUSION
Despite the ultimate authority rule being molded to allay
concerns present only in private actions and to mesh seamlessly with
precedent not applicable to the SEC, “make” does not disappear
from Rule 10b-5(b) when the SEC is the plaintiff. To that end, Janus’s
ultimate authority rule, whether intended or as a result of collateral
damage, constrains the scope of actors the SEC can prosecute as
225. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012)
(reestablishing aiding-and-abetting liability).
226. See Cox, supra note 41, at 537 (discussing the effects of applying Central Bank to the
SEC).
227. Id. at 537, 539.
228. Id. at 539.
229. See Metzger, supra note 214, at 1630–33 (considering how the combination of divided
government and political polarization render government “especially prone to conflict and
stalemate” (citation omitted)).
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primary participants under that provision. The Supreme Court’s
puzzling methodology is plausibly explained as an attempt to prompt
the SEC or Congress into bringing Rule 10b-5(b) and Section
17(a)(2) into equilibrium with one another. After all, Rule 10b-5 is
derived substantially from Section 17(a) and was meant to serve the
same purpose. The SEC has taken notice, and perhaps the courts will
defer to its interpretation of scheme liability under Rule 10b-5(a) and
(c) as reaching the claims foreclosed by Janus. If not, either the SEC
or Congress may need to take additional action to resolve this
incongruence.

